BULLETIN 47
THE OVERTAKING SITUATION
or
A Lesson for a Dumb Ensign
October 1, 2005
Lcdr. Hanssen, captain of the Wahoo (SS-565) during the 1950s was one fine gentleman. I know this for a fact, because I rode the Wahoo for six months as an ensign. Having qualified in submarines as an enlisted man it would not be an exaggeration for me to brag that I was an excellent bow and stern planesman. After O.C.S. I went to ComSubPac staff as assistant communicator where I learned nothing of submarines. Requesting to go to an operating submarine before going to New London and basic officer submarine school, I found myself on Wahoo.
Ensign Pulver had nothing on me, but the captain was gracious enough to let me stand underway watches after a brief period of instruction. Of the many chewing-outs I received, one stands out as particularly poignant relative to a recent incident in the Persian Gulf. It was about one in the morning on a pitch black sea and cloud-covered sky as Wahoo ran on the surface toward Guam. I had the deck on the bridge and all was well. Radar reported a contact dead astern at about twelve thousand yards. Radar continued to track the contact which had a slowly closing range and constant bearing.
The port lookout reported that he could now see the masthead light and running lights of the contact. I continued to monitor the contact and reviewed in my mind the captain's standing orders. He wanted to be kept informed of all contacts that represented any kind of threat to the safety of Wahoo and under no circumstances was the O.D. to allow a ship to get closer than two thousand yards without the captain knowing about it. This order I weighed against the Rules of the Nautical Road, which I had learned in O.C.S. In an overtaking situation the vessel overtaking is burdened while the ship being overtaken is privileged. The privileged ship is bound to maintain course and speed, while the burdened ship is obligated to maneuver in such a way as to avoid the overtaken vessel.
My course of action was clear, I would stay on course and speed per the Rules of the Nautical Road and would call the captain when the approaching ship came within two thousand yards. Radar and my lookouts did their jobs and when the vessel bearing down on me was at the required range I called control to wake the captain and so inform him.
Within thirty seconds the captain was on the bridge. He took the conn and ordered, "Right full rudder, come right to zero two zero." This was a ninety degree change of course and seemed to me to be a violation of the Rules of the Road and far in excess of what might be required if one were to throw caution to the wind and avoid the approaching ship.
Captain Hanssen had a lot of self control and how he was able to fight back the
urge to throw me over the side is unknown to me even now. He patiently
explained,
"1. The Rules of the Nautical Road were written for surface ships, not submarines. The overtaking light or stern light on a submarine is so low that it is easy for an overtaking ship not to see it.
"2. Since a submarine is five sixths below the surface its running lights and
masthead light are all reflective of a much smaller vessel.
A radar reflection from a submarine is about the same as a small fishing vessel.
"3. An overtaking merchant ship is likely to look with disdain at a single puny light ahead with small radar return. Therefore a submarine is only safe when it sets the Rules aside and makes a large course change as early as possible. This gives the overtaking vessel the opportunity to see the running light and masthead light. He also will track a significant change in bearing rate which will not involve any use of the Rules of the Nautical Road."
The captain summed up his lesson, "So from now on, get the hell out of his way as soon as you determine you are the privileged vessel in an overtaking situation."
The chewing out stuck with me and I eventually became a competent submarine officer. That's why I have a hard time understanding an article by Robert A. Hamilton on September 9th which in part reads,
". . .the freighter was coming up behind the submarine (USS Philadelphia, SSN 690) about thirty miles off the Baharain coast and apparently ran right up over the back of the ship, scraping along the starboard side of the hull, the fairwater plane, the rudder and the housing for the towed sonar array. Sources said under international maritime "rules of the road" any vessel overtaking another must automatically yield the right of way, so if the M/V Yaso Aysen is found to have been over taking the submarine, then legally the Philadelphia would be in the clear, which could mean that the Navy is not responsible for legal damages to the freighter."
I wonder if the officer of the deck was an ensign.