Bulletin 69 described in glowing terms Britain's newest nuclear powered submarine, H.M.S. Astute. It turns out that Astute's shipbuilders have not been all that astute. The Submarine Review article, "LCS: A Danger Signal for Shipbuilding" by RADM. William J. Holland contradicts some of the information in SRC's earlier bulletin. The following are a few of the points regarding submarine construction in Britain as compared to that in the United States suggested by Captain Steve Ramm of the Royal Navy.

1. Scheduled for sea trials this spring, Astute has cost the British government 30% more than originally predicted and is currently three years late in its construction.
2. The Ministry of Defense, in charge of Astute's construction, is so focused on budgetary limitations that design and construction problems are subjected to endless analysis.
3. Unit cost analysis was made from offices staffed by specialists at computers who had no knowledge of the peculiar demands of submarine construction.

Both Britain and United States went through a period when they overly relied upon private industry to solve engineering problems. This phenomenon, during the 1980s, ignored the necessity to integrate civilian and naval design experts. In trusting private industry to solve submarine design and construction problems Britain's Ministry of Defense cast about for a contractor to build the Astute. It turned out that so much time had elapsed from the last submarine construction all the expertise had evaporated. The Ministry developed the bid specifications by what it thought a modern submarine should be able to do. The prime contract to build Astute went to a shipbuilder that had never built a submarine and had no staff knowledgeable of submarine design. The result was construction chaos from the outset.

Astute is supposed to be the lead ship in a series of nuclear powered submarines, but the future of the Trafalgar class is now in doubt.

Two lessons are to be learned from the Astute fiasco.

1. The United States submarine shipbuilding program must be continuous enough to support at least two groups of expert designers and builders. This is evident in the alternating building programs at Groton and Newport News. A generational gap cannot be allowed to occur.
2. The management of the submarine shipbuilding program must continue to be guided by the organizational genius of the Navy's great thinkers: King, Nimitz and Rickover. Since government cannot extricate itself from the submarine building business it must be careful not to fall into the morass of the Littoral Combat Ship concept. Paraphrasing Holland, "The last Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research , Development and Acquisition had been an electrical engineering professor at the Naval Academy. Reporting to her were 11 Deputy Assistant Secretaries, 14 Program Executive Officers and 7 Systems Commanders." In affect, no single person was responsible and progress in the LCS program became mired in bureaucratic quicksand.

We can thank the structure provided by the exactness of the nuclear power program for a responsible submarine construction schedule. Britain's problems belong to Britain. America has learned from its mistakes and successes.