Germany's navy, immediately prior to the First World War, was controlled by the Reichsmarineamt, which in turn was dominated by Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz. The distinguished gentleman with the long beard was convinced that if a war in Europe was to come, it would be decided by one great sea battle between Great Britain and Germany. He new that Britain had a line of ships that could not be matched by an adversary; however, he theorized that if a lesser navy could be brought to a strength that was enough to pose a threat, Britain would not gamble on a single battle that might significantly reduce its sea power. He convinced Kaiser Wilhelm II that his country should embark on an ambitious battleship building program. When his country went to war in 1914 the program was accelerated.

The Germania Yard at Kiel, Schieben at Danzig, AG Wesser at Bremen, Blom and Voss at Hamburg and Vulcan at Stettin devoted huge resources to building fast, heavily armed battleships. Krupp produced the armor and armament. On the fringe of this frantic building program was Admiral Reinhard Scheer, who, although enthusiastic about a growing navy advocated for a more balanced approach and in particular a strong submarine contingent.

Von Tirpitz realized his dream of a single sea engagement at the battle of Jutland. The German battleships and cruisers were expertly manipulated by Admiral Scheer in this battle, but his best effort fell short of inflicting serious damage to the British fleet. Von Tirpitz's "Risk Theory" failed to produce the anticipated result and his dominance in the Germany navy deteriorated. The rising star was Scheer, who's advocacy for a balanced navy now took root. Added to his popularity and extreme ability, were the undeniable successes of Uboats in sinking British ships. Even though the Kaiser forbade unrestricted warfare for fear of antagonizing neutral America, British loses from submarine attacks were impressive. As von Tirpitz faded from the scene, the German submarine building program picked up speed.

Capital ships on the ways were dismantled and melted down to make fast, light surface ships and submarines. Unfortunately for Germany, the two-front land war was sapping the nation's labor force. Skilled workers in the ship yards were now on the fronts to be replaced with unskilled workers and women. This condition crippled the German submarine building program, but loses were few and those boats that were built added to a growing Uboat arm. When in 1918 the nation was suffering from inflation and had consumed its manpower, it became clear to those in power that the end was near. Despite this, Admiral Scheer continued to dream of his 300 boat submarine force. Many submarines were left on the ways when the armistice was signed. For those in power the significance of the submarine could not be denied.

Of course, the Versailles Treaty precluded a resurgence of German submarine construction, but the seeds had been laid for a more formidable fleet of the Second World War. In spite of the obvious lessons learned by the navy in the Great War, von Tirpitz's theories lingered. Admiral Eric Raeder carried to Adolf Hitler a vision of a massive battleship that could dominate the seas. Hitler, a lover of big weapons, fell for the illusion and much of Germany's pre-Second World War ship building was devoted to battleship construction. The pleas of Admiral Karl Doenitz failed to dent the predominant thinking; however, the sinking of the Bismark punctuated the demise of the battleship. Hitler, being a land-battle, self-made expert lost interest in the navy and allocated a small portion of his nation's resources to it. But as Doenitz's boats racked up spectacular victories such as Scapa Flow, Hitler supported the Uboat building program.

As had been the case in the First World War, the effort came too late. Germany never had the number of boats it needed to seriously damage the convoys of Great Britain. The advent of Allied radar and sonar put the Uboats on the defensive; a posture from which it never recovered. Excellent boats such as the Type XXI and XXIII designs might have made a difference, but Germany was defeated before these could be brought into play.